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EMPLOYER TROs ARE ALL THE RAGE:
A NEW APPROACH TO
WORKPLACE VIOLENCE
Kyle Riley*
This Article examines the emerging phenomenon of the Employer TRO -
a remedy that allows employers to obtain TROs in response to the threat of
workplace violence. The author argues that the employer TRO arms employers
with new substantive rights, increases the protection of employees, and reduces
the employer's liability for incidents of workplace violence. A comprehensive
examination of the current responses to workplace violence indicates that
employers and employees lack a response to the imminent workplace assault.
I. INTRODUCTION
Danton Camm worked for the City of Palo Alto in California for nearly 15
years,' supervising a crew of workers in the utilities department.2 Camm, an
avid hunter, boasted that he "could kill a man at 600 yards." 3 His pickup car-
ried the vanity license plate "SHOOOT." 4 He owned 18 rifles and pistols, and
had even once mistakenly brought a pistol to work. 5 On more than one occa-
sion, Camm had threatened to shoot co-workers, but his co-workers, under-
standing these comments to be a running joke, did not take them seriously.6
Eventually, Camm's threats and disposition became more serious. The City of
Palo Alto suspended Camm twice for threatening behavior.7 When an
employee notified Camm that he had complained about Camm to a supervisor,
Camin threatened to shoot the employee, the employee's wife, and the
employee' s new baby if the City of Palo Alto fired him.8
What separates the story of Danton Camm from other threats and violent
incidents in the workplace is that the City of Palo Alto was able to obtain a
temporary restraining order (TRO), effective for two weeks, enjoining Camm
from making contact with the employee (staying 100 yards away from the
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I City of Palo Alto v. Serv. Employees Int'l Union, 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d 500, 502 (1999).
2 Id.
3 Id.
4Id.
5 Id.
6 id.
7 Id. at 502-03.
8 Id. at 502.
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employee, the employee's residence, place of work, and place of child care).9
The City of Palo Alto later extended the TRO into an injunction lasting for
three years and promptly terminated Camm's employment.' °
This Article examines the new phenomenon of the employer TRO to
address workplace violence. California was the first state to enact such a statu-
tory scheme, passing the Workplace Violence Safety Act in November of
1994." Arizona enacted similar legislation in 2000.12 Nevada most recently
followed suit by enacting Nevada Assembly Bill 370 ("A.B. 370") in June of
2001, which became effective in October 2001.13 Nevada modeled A.B. 370
after the Arizona and California statutes. 14
This Article argues that the new approach - employer TROS - provides
employers with new substantive rights to effectively address workplace vio-
lence. Part II analyzes the current threat of workplace violence. Part III identi-
fies the myriad of options available to either the employer or the victims to
respond to workplace violence. Generalized options address all potential
offenders in the workplace, whereas specific options target a specific type of
workplace violence. Some options aim to prevent workplace violence, while
other options aim to respond to a specific incident of workplace violence. Part
IV examines California, Arizona, and Nevada experiments with the employer
TRO. This section compares the employer TRO with current available options
and argues that the employer TRO fills identified gaps in the current response
to workplace violence. This section acknowledges that the employer TRO may
alter employment responsibilities and disrupt some existing employment laws,
but argues that the need for employer TROs outweighs any negative side
effects of authorizing employer TROs.
II. ASSESSING THE RISK OF WORKPLACE VIOLENCE
A. Workplace Violence: The Employer's Greatest Concern
While incidents of workplace violence do not appear to be on the rise,
society is paying greater attention to the problem.' 5 Increasing awareness of
9 Id. at 502-03.
10 Id. at 503. An arbitrator later reinstated Cami upon a finding that Camm did not intend
to carry out his threat, that the City denied Camin due process, and that the City denied
Camm's right to union representation and the right to a fair and full investigation. Id. Inter-
estingly, a court reversed the arbitrator's order because reinstatement was inconsistent with
the injunction, enjoining Camm from being within 100 yards of the workplace. Id. at 508.
"1 CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 527.8 (West 2001).
12 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-1810 (2001).
13 Assemb. B. No. 370, 2001 Leg., 71st Sess. (Nev. 2001).
14 Meetings of the Assembly Committee on Judiciary, 71st Sess. 7 (Apr. 5, 2001), available
at http://www.leg.state.nv.us/7 Ist/minutes/assembly/JUD/final/87 1.html (last visited July 28,
2003). Six other states have also enacted workplace TRO statutes. ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-
15-115 (Michie 2003); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-14-102(4)(b) (2003); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-1-
7 (2003); IND. CODE § 34-26-6-6 (2003); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-52-2 (2003); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 20-14-102 (2003).
'5 INJURY PREVENTION RESEARCH CENTER, WORKPLACE VIOLENCE: A REPORT TO THE
NATION 4 (Feb. 2001), at http://www.public-health.uiowa.edu/IPRC/NATION.PDF (last vis-
ited July 28, 2003) [hereinafter REPORT TO THE NATION] (noting a sharp decline in homi-
cides at workplaces from 1994 to 1999). From 1993 to 1999, violent crimes in the
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workplace violence is due, in part, to the media's sensationalism of acts of
violence in the workplace. 16 However, the significant toll exerted by work-
place violence cannot be understated, and the statistics are alarming. One out
of every four employees will be a victim of workplace violence during their
life.' 7 One out of every six violent crimes occurs in the workplace. 8 As an
occupational hazard, homicide is the second leading cause of death, accounting
for one sixth of all occupational fatalities. 9 Every year 1,000 people are mur-
dered in the workplace; another 1.5 to 2 million people are victims of assault,
rape, or robbery.2 0 Offenders use various means to disrupt the workplace. For
example, everyday 16,400 threats are made, 723 workers are attacked and
43,800 workers are harassed.
2
'
Workplace violence also has a ripple effect, affecting not only the targeted
victim, but everyone associated with the workplace. Violence in the workplace
may inflict irreparable psychological harm. One report concludes that "nega-
tive publicity drives customers away, valued employees leave the company and
new hires are harder to attract.",22 Workplace violence also imposes substantial
financial costs. Experts estimate the total economic loss to be around $4.2
billion a year.2 3 Given the frequency and severity of workplace violence, it is
not surprising that for the last three years, workplace violence has been
employers' greatest concern.2 4
B. Types of Workplace Violence
Incidents of workplace violence share certain characteristics. While the
victims are more often male, workplace violence is the top occupational hazard
resulting in death for women. 25 The offenders are overwhelmingly male, and
workplace decreased forty-four percent, whereas violent crime as a whole decreased forty
percent. DETIS T. DUHART, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, VIOLENCE IN THE WORKPLACE, 1993-99
1 (Dec. 2001), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/vw99.pdf (last visited July
28, 2003).
16 Kathy McCabe, Plan Tries to Prevent Workplace Violence, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 21,
2002, at 8 (describing how a workplace attack killing seven employees in Wakefield, Massa-
chusetts brought worldwide attention to the small town).
1 Timothy Pajak, Workplace Violence Tops Corporate Security Concerns, HR WIRE, Apr.
16, 2001.
18 Amy D. Whitten & Deanne M. Mosley, Caught in the Crossfire: Employers' Liability for
Workplace Violence, 70 Miss L.J. 505, 506 (2000).
19 GREG WARCHOL, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, WORKPLACE VIOLENCE, 1992-96 6 (July 1998),
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/wv96.pdf (last visited July 28, 2003).
20 Jerry Goldstein, Workplace Violence vs. Employee Rights, 35 MD. B.J. 46 (Jan./Feb.
2002); REPORT TO THE NATION, supra note 15, at 4.
21 Pajak, supra note 17 (citing to Top Security Threats and Management Issues Facing
Corporate America, available at http://www.ci-pinkerton.com (last visited July 28, 2003)).
22 Id.
23 Jules M. Davis, Potential Violence to the Bottom Line - Expanding Employer Liability
for Acts of Workplace Violence in North Carolina, 78 N.C. L. REV. 2053, 2054 (2000).
24 Pajak, supra note 17.
25 DUHART, supra note 15, at 2 (noting that men are fifty-six percent more likely to be
victims of workplace violence than women); Whitten & Mosley, supra note 18, at 506 (com-
menting that homicide is the "number one cause of [female] workplace death in the United
States").
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tend to act alone.2 6 In one out of every five incidents, the offender is carrying a
weapon.2 7 The government is the employer most at risk of workplace vio-
lence.2 8 These characteristics do not adequately explain the phenomenon of
workplace violence, and do not provide any useful modes of analysis. To bet-
ter understand the problem of workplace violence, experts classify incidents
based on the type of offender, identifying four different types: the stranger, the
customer/client, the co-worker/former employee, and the personal
relationship.2 9
1. Type I: The Stranger
Type I incidents include those where the offender does not have any legiti-
mate relationship with the business entity, employer, or employee. Over-
whelming statistics indicate that the stranger is the most dangerous and most
common offender in the workplace, accounting for nearly sixty percent of vio-
lent incidents in the workplace and eighty-four percent of workplace homi-
cides.3 ° The stranger often resorts to violence during the commission of a
crime, and frequently the stranger possesses a dangerous weapon. 3'
Theft is often the motive behind Type I incidents. 32 As such, certain sec-
tors of employment are more likely to fall prey to these violent incidents. The
stranger tends to target workplaces that are open 24 hours, have little security,
and primarily operate cash transactions. 33 Convenience store clerks, taxi driv-
ers, and security guards are typical victims of Type I violence.3 4 Industries
such as the medical, law enforcement, transportation, and the retail sales indus-
tries are also particularly at risk.35
2. Type II: Customer/Client
Type II offenders include both willing and unwilling clients (such as the
prisoner or crime suspect). These incidents are distinguished from Type I
attacks, because the customer or client has a legitimate relationship with the
workplace, but reacts violently "during the course of a normal transaction.
36
These incidents rarely result in death, but are frequent nonetheless and may be
a common occurrence for some employees.37 Mental health workers, teachers,
26 DUHART, supra note 15, at 7 tbl.13 (noting that offenders are male and over eighty per-
cent of the time the offender is acting alone).
27 Id. at 7 tbl. 12.
28 Id. at 5 tbl.9 (noting a high rate of incidents in government workplaces (28.6 incidents for
every 1000 workers in the workforce)).
29 REPORT TO THE NATION, supra note 15, at 4 ("Addressing this problem is complicated,
because workplace violence has many sources. To better understand its causes and possible
solutions, researchers have divided workplace violence into four categories. Most incidents
fall into one of these categories[ ].").
30 Id. at 10 tbl.20; WARCHOL, supra note 19, at 4 tbl.8.
31 REPORT TO THE NATION, supra note 15, at 5.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 DUHART, supra note 15, at 8 tbl.15.
36 REPORT TO THE NATION, supra note 15, at 7.
37 DUHART, supra note 15, at 10 tbl.20 (noting that four percent of workplace homicides are
committed by a customer or client).
[Vol. 4:1
EMPLOYER TROs
social workers, bus and taxi drivers, and police officers face Type II violence
with frequency.3 8
3. Type III: Co-worker/Former Employee
Type III violence (violence connitted by a co-worker or former
employee) receives the most media attention, but accounts for only seven per-
cent of workplace homicides (or sixty-seven homicides a year). 39 Because
these incidents of workplace violence often relate to internal work disputes,
managers or supervisors may be more likely targeted by the Type III offender
than other types of offenders.4 ° Type III violence is not more common in one
workplace vis A vis another.4 '
4. Type IV: Personal Relationship
The final category of workplace violence involves the Type IV offender
who has a personal relationship with the intended victim. The offender targets
a particular individual in the workplace because of an external dispute. Offend-
ers typically are not current or former employees. 42 Overwhelmingly, the
attackers are male.43 This category exclusively includes domestic violence
attacks in the workplace. 44
Each incident of workplace violence, regardless of type, should be of a
particular concern to employees and employers. Currently both employers and
victims have multiple options they may undertake to redress injuries or prevent
future incidents.
III. EXISTING PREVENTATIVE, CORRECTIVE, AND REMEDIAL APPROACHES
TO WORKPLACE VIOLENCE
Several options exist that victims of workplace violence and employers
can use to address incidents of workplace violence. Employers can adopt inter-
nal procedures to help prevent, identify, or diffuse potential workplace vio-
lence. Employers can also obtain limited injunctive relief through tort actions.
Victims of workplace violence may be able to obtain a restraining order against
the offender, obtain a money judgment against the employer through various
claims of employer liability, or obtain limited relief through OSHA procedures.
A detailed analysis of each option follows.
38 REPORT TO THE NATION, supra note 15, at 7.
39 DUHART, supra note 15, at 10 tbl.20.
40 REPORT TO THE NATION, supra note 15, at 9.
"J See id. (stating that the postal industry is "no more likely than any other industry to be
affected by this type of violence").
42 Id. at 11.
43 DUHART, supra note 15, at 10 tbl.19 (noting that from 1993 to 1999 males were more
than four times more likely to be the attacker than females).
44 REPORT TO THE NATION, supra note 15, at I I (commenting that "[b]ecause of the insidi-
ous nature of domestic violence, it is given a category all its own in the typology of work-
place violence").
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A. Employer Options
1. Physical Security of the Workplace: A Generalized Preventative
Approach
There are many measures employers can take to increase the security of
the workplace, which will also help prevent workplace violence. Employers
can (1) perform audits on the security of the workplace to develop a security
plan; (2) reduce access to the workplace where possible with use of locks,
security cards, or codes;45 and (3) improve lighting, maintain surveillance cam-
eras where appropriate, employ security guards to monitor the workplace, and/
or install alarms to notify the police or others of a security breach or a potential
46situation.
These measures can be costly for the employer, but the employer often
will derive substantial benefit from a secure workplace and can justify the cost
accordingly. By having a secure workplace, the employer can defray the eco-
nomic burden of workplace violence and also protect trade secrets.4 7 The
employer will not incur additional costs from liability by maintaining a physi-
cally secure workplace. However, improper monitoring may invite an "intru-
sion upon seclusion" claim or an "invasion of the right to privacy" claim by
employees. To avoid incurring this liability, employers should notify employ-
ees about monitoring being conducted.4 8
Physical security measures may be ineffective in preventing co-worker/
former employee (Type III) or customer/client (Type II) workplace violence.49
Given that these offenders, by definition, have a legitimate business relation-
ship with the company, it follows that they will easily obtain entry into the
workplace because they are entitled to be there. However, some measures
(such as alarms, security guards, and surveillance cameras) may still reduce
violence or enable the employer to respond appropriately. Physical security
measures may be the only solution when the offender is a stranger (Type I) or
shares a personal relationship with the victim (Type IV). In Type I or Type IV
incidents, the offender does not have a legitimate relationship with the
employer and could be categorically, physically screened from the workplace
" Robert L. Levin, Workplace Violence: Navigating Through the Minefield of Legal Liabil-
ity, 11 LAB. LAW. 171, 186 (1995).
46 Id.; Tom Collins, Acts of Violence are Usually Followed by Suits Against the Employer,
24 LEGAL TIMES, May 28, 2001, at 41.
47 See supra Part II.A (discussing the economic ripple effects of workplace violence); UNIF.
TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 438 (1990) (requiring trade secrets to
be "the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its
secrecy[ ]").
48 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1976); Vera-Rodriguez v. P.R. Tel. Co.,
110 F.3d 174, 180 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that open video surveillance did not violate the
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution because there is no legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy under the Fourth Amendment where an object is exposed to plain view and
the viewer's presence at the vantage point is lawful); Sanders v. Am. Broad. Co., 85 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 909, 919 (Cal. 1999) (holding that "a person who lacks a reasonable expectation of
complete privacy in a conversation, because it could be seen and overheard by co-workers
(but not the general public), may nevertheless have a claim for invasion of privacy by intru-
sion based on a television reporter's covert videotaping of that conversation.").
49 REPORT TO THE NATION, supra note 15, at 7, 9.
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to avoid potential incidents of workplace violence. Thus, increasing physical
security is exclusively a preventative tool and primarily addresses Type I and
Type IV offenders. The preventative measure is also generalized, in that it
addresses the entire class of Type I and Type IV offenders as opposed to
addressing specific offenders within the class.
2. Applicant Screening: A Hybrid Preventative Approach
Although physical security may not be an effective approach to address
co-worker/former employee violence (Type III), one way to prevent Type III
violence is pre-employment application screening. Applicant screening can be
classified as a hybrid measure because screening applicants is both generalized
and individualized.5 ° In one sense the measure is generalized because the
employer is indiscriminately screening all prospective employees in an attempt
to exclude the potentially violent employees. However, applicant screening can
also become individualized after a prospective employee has been red-flagged.
The employer must make an individualized decision about whether to offer the
applicant employment or whether to deny employment altogether.
By checking references, conducting background checks, and using effec-
tive interviewing skills, an employer can identify and exclude some potential
offenders. One executive of a company, albeit a company that performs back-
ground checks for employers, warns that "[a] dangerous employee is like hav-
ing a dangerous piece of machinery on the floor . . . . He or she poses a
potential risk to other workers and to the entire company."'5' However, when
an employer actively screens employees out of the hiring pool, employers
should evaluate whether there could be any discrimination claims. 52
a. The Risk of Employer Liability for ADA Violations
In the workplace violence context, employers should be concerned about
potentially violating the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). 53 If
screening an applicant triggers the filing of ADA claims, employers will be
reluctant to use the preventative measure, causing applicant screening to be an
ineffective option for employers. Before addressing the specific methods of
screening applicants, an evaluation of the threat of ADA claims is warranted.
First, employers must evaluate whether the ADA even applies. The ADA
prohibits discrimination against qualified individuals with disabilities in the
review of applications and hiring processes, as well as all other phases of
employment.54 In order to be covered by the Act, applicants must demonstrate
50 In one sense the measure is generalized because the employer might indiscriminately
screen all prospective employees in an attempt to exclude the potentially violent employee.
For example, employers might generally look for gaps in employment, which may be a result
of previous acts of violence. See ALFRED G. FELIU & WEYMAN T. JOHNSON, NEGLIGENCE IN
EMPLOYMENT LAW 68 (2002). However, applicant screening can also become individual-
ized after a qualified prospective employee has been red-flagged. Id. at 144-45. The
employer must make an individualized decision about whether to deny employment
altogether.
"' David Kelly, How Well Do You Know Your Workforce?, HR WIRE, Oct. 8, 2001.
52 FELIU & WEYMAN, supra note 50, at 68.
53 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117 (2000) (as pertaining to private employers).
54 Id. § 12112(a).
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that they are qualified individuals with a disability." The ADA defines disa-
bility as "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such impair-
ment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment."5 6 In the context of
screening out potentially violent employees, employers are attempting to
exclude individuals with certain mental characteristics and may be excluding
individuals with mental impairments. Mental impairments are specifically
included within the definition of disability. However, an applicant must leap
over two hurdles to receive ADA protection.
The first hurdle applicants must leap is to demonstrate that either their
mental impairment substantially limits a major life activity or that the employer
regards them as having such a condition.57 The ADA does not cover all mental
impairments or those regarded as mental impairments. If the employer is only
addressing concerns over workplace violence, the employer will only exclude
employees who become easily irritable and are prone to violent outbursts. This
basis for exclusion does not regard excluded employees as having a mental
impairment that substantially limits a major life activity. "[P]eople who
become easily angered ... are commonplace. [A] low threshold of tolerance is
not unique, nor does it merit recognition under the ADA."58 Furthermore,
"poor judgment, irresponsible behavior and poor impulse control do not
amount to a mental condition that Congress intended to be considered an
impairment . . . ." While some employees who are excluded under a screen-
ing for potentially violent employees may suffer from a mental impairment that
qualifies as a disability under the ADA, a narrowly tailored screening will not
be the basis for arguing that the employer regarded the employee as having a
disability.
Assuming the employee leaps over the disability hurdle, the employee
must still demonstrate qualification for the position. If an applicant is screened
out of the hiring pool under a narrowly tailored screening to identify potentially
violent employees, the applicant is likely not qualified for the position. The
Seventh Circuit announced this explicitly in Palmer v. Circuit Court of Cook
County, Illinois, a case involving a social service caseworker who threatened
a co-worker.
[I]f an employer fires an employee because of the employee's unacceptable behavior,
the fact that that behavior was precipitated by a mental illness does not present an
55 Id.
56 Id. § 12102(2). The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the federal
agency authorized to enforce the ADA and other anti-discrimination laws, defines mental
impairment to include "mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental
illness, and specific learning disabilities." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (2002).
57 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
58 Fenton v. Pritchard Corp., 926 F. Supp. 1437, 1440 (D. Kan. 1996). Fenton repeatedly
made unwanted contact with a co-worker after the co-worker ended their relationship. Id. at
1441. The co-worker repeatedly complained to management, resulting in several warnings
to Fenton to discontinue contact with the co-worker or risk termination. Id. Fenton
assaulted the co-worker outside the workplace, resulting in his termination. Id. at 1441-42.
The court dismissed Fenton's ADA claim on summary judgment because Fenton did not
suffer from a mental disability as defined under the ADA. Id. at 1446.
51 Id. at 1446 (quoting Daley v. Koch, 892 F.2d 212, 215 (2d Cir. 1989)).
60 117 F.3d 351 (7th Cir. 1997).
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issue under the Americans with Disabilities Act . . . . The Act does not require an
employer to retain a potentially violent employee. Such a requirement would place
the employer on a razor's edge - in jeopardy of violating the Act if it fired such an
employee, yet in jeopardy of being deemed negligent if it retained him and he hurt
someone. The Act protects only "qualified" employees, that is, employees qualified
to do the job for which they were hired; and threatening other employees disqualifies
one.
6 1
Related to the second hurdle is the "direct threat" defense. The ADA
allows employers to impose "qualification standards" including "a requirement
that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other
individuals in the workplace. 62 When an employer screens employees during
the application process, the employer may have less information on which to
base an employment decision than after hiring the applicant, because the
employer does not have the opportunity to observe the applicant in the work
environment. A lack of evidence may frustrate the employer's attempt to assert
a "direct threat" defense because the employer must make a substantial show-
ing of "direct threat." "[I]f the individual is screened out for safety reasons, the
employer must demonstrate that the individual poses a . . . significant risk of
substantial harm to him/herself or others, and that the risk cannot be reduced
below the direct threat level through a reasonable accommodation. 63
These two hurdles demonstrate that an employer using a narrowly tailored
scheme for screening applicants should not be concerned about ADA viola-
tions. However, an employer may inadvertently exclude a qualified individual
with a disability by screening potentially violent employees from the hiring
pool. For example, the screening may result in an inaccurate determination that
the prospective employee is a danger to others. In the rare case where an
employee is able to leap the first two hurdles, the third element of an ADA
claim, that the employee suffered an adverse employment action as a result of
the disability, is relatively easy to prove. At the very least, it presents an issue
of fact entitling the case to go to trial.' In such a case, the employer will bear
the burden of proof that the potential employee constituted a direct threat.65
Thus, if the employer deviates from limited applicant screening, the employer
should be concerned about potential ADA violations.
61 Id. at 352 (citations omitted).
62 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (2000) (emphasis added) (§12113(a) states that failing to qualify
under (b) may serve as a defense to a charge of discrimination). The court evaluates a direct
threat defense based on a "reasonable medical judgment" of four factors: "(1) the duration of
the risk; (2) the nature and severity of the potential harm; (3) the likelihood that the potential
harm will occur; and (4) the imminence of the potential harm." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r).
63 EEOC, ADA ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: PRE-EMPLOYMENT DISABILITY RELATED QUES-
TIONS AND MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS, Oct. 10, 1995, at *2, available at 1995 WL 1789073.
64 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1) (defining the term "discriminate" in conjunction with
§12112(a)'s prohibition against discriminatory conduct). An employer may even admit to
the causation prong - that the employee was not hired because of the condition - in an
attempt to validate the application screening and seek dismissal on other grounds.
65 Hutton v. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc., 273 F.3d 884, 893 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Nunes v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 164 F.3d 1243, 1247 (9th Cir. 1999)).
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b. Reference Checking
By checking references, employers may be able to prevent incidents of
violence in the workplace by excluding violent employees. However, as a
result of lawsuits by former employees for defamation and tortious interference
with prospective contractual relations, former employers are hesitant to volun-
teer information. Checking references often elicits nothing more than the pro-
spective employee's dates of prior employment and the title of his former
position.66
Employers may be able to obtain more specific information from former
employers if they require applicants to sign a written authorization for the
release of information from former employers. This practice ensures that for-
mer employers are protected under the qualified privilege defense, which will
hold former employers harmless for statements made in good faith during refer-
ence checking. 67 However, even a written authorization may not persuade for-
mer employers to provide further information, because the qualified privilege
defense does not provide absolute immunity to defamation lawsuits.68
Despite the ineffectiveness of reference checking to identify and exclude
dangerous employees, employers should continue the formality of reference
checking for at least two reasons. First, checking references exacts little cost to
the employer, and in some situations may identify dangerous prospective
employees if the former employer is cooperative. There are not any direct costs
associated with reference checking, because this can be done over the telephone
with relative convenience. It is not necessary to check the references of all
applicants, but only those applicants where employment offers may be ten-
dered. In addition, some former employers may be willing to identify danger-
ous former employees. Reference checking will often amount to little gain, but
requires little investment of resources.
Employers should also continue to check references to avoid claims of
negligent hiring by victims of workplace violence. One of the necessary ele-
ments of a negligent hiring claim is that the employer negligently employed a
dangerous employee.69 Constructive knowledge of the danger will be proven if
the plaintiff can show a reasonable investigation would have disclosed the
employee was potentially dangerous.7 ° For example, a plaintiff might contend
66 See, e.g., Eileen Drake, Limiting Workplace Violence: Effective Management of Volatile
Employees, in EMPLOYMENT LAW ADVICE 3-2 (2001); see also, e.g., Chambers v. Am. Trans
Air, Inc., 577 N.E.2d 612 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (affirming the trial court's summary judgment
in a defamation lawsuit for defendants based on the qualified privilege defense); Delloma v.
Consolidation Coal Co., 996 F.2d 168 (7th Cir. 1993) (affirming the trial court's summary
judgment in a tortious interference lawsuit for defendant's based on the qualified privilege
defense).
67 Delloma, 996 F.2d at 168.
68 Id. at 170 (stating that a finding of actual malice on behalf of the former employer would
defeat a qualified privilege defense).
69 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 213 (1957) (stating that "[a] person conducting an
activity through servants or other agents is subject to liability for harm resulting from his
conduct if he is negligent or reckless ... in the employment of improper persons or instru-
mentalities in work involving risk of harm to others.").
70 Id. § 213 cmt.D, explaining that
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that if the employer had checked the employee's references, the employer
would have learned of prior acts of workplace violence.
c. Criminal Background Checks
The employer may be able to supplement reference information by con-
ducting an independent criminal background check of the prospective
employee. Employers are generally not required to conduct a criminal back-
ground check to meet their duty of care under negligence law.7 However,
many employers, especially in the wake of the September 11 th terrorist attacks,
voluntarily perform background checks as a routine matter.72 Background
checks might disclose violent crimes previously committed by prospective
employees. The employer may want to exclude individuals convicted of vio-
lent crimes based on the belief that the commission of prior violence is "proof-
positive... of a violent personality. '73 Background checks will not exclude all
individuals with a violent personality, but will exclude individuals who have
reacted violently in the past.
Employers do not have unfettered discretion in conducting criminal back-
ground checks because state and federal laws place substantive and procedural
limitations on their use. Because of a state interest in rehabilitating convicted
criminals, some states limit the use of background checks.7" The use of arrest
records may also invite disparate impact race discrimination claims under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, because minorities might be unevenly
[a]n agent ...may be incompetent because of his reckless or vicious disposition, and if a
principal, without exercising due care in selection, employs a vicious person to do an act which
necessarily brings him in contact with others while in the performance of a duty, he is subject to
liability for harm caused by the vicious propensity.
71 Alfred G. Feliu, Workplace Violence and the Duty of Care: The Scope of an Employer's
Obligation to Protect Against the Violent Employee, 20 EMP. REL. L.J. 381, 384 (1994). As
the article notes, however, employers may have to conduct such a check to avoid negligence
where the type of employment contemplated involves security or serious risk of injury. Id.
72 Kelly, supra note 51. Fifty-eight percent of employers are more likely to use background
checks after September lth. Id. Sixty percent of employers currently perform routine
background checks on new employees. Id.
71 Feliu, supra note 71, at 392-93.
71 N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 752 (McKinney 2001) (prohibiting the denial of employment
because of prior criminal offenses or a lack of "good moral character" unless "there is a
direct relationship [with] the criminal offense[ ] and the specific... employment sought[ ] or
[if] the issuance of... employment would involve an unreasonable risk to property or to the
safety or welfare of specific individuals or the general public"); Wis. STAT. § 111.335
(2001) (prohibiting the request of arrest records except those relating to pending charges and
prohibiting the denial of employment based on conviction record except when the crime
"substantially relate[s] to the circumstances of the particular job"); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 53-
10-102, 53-10-108 (2001), amended by 2002 Utah Laws Ch. 13 (HB 35) (only authorizing
the dissemination of criminal records for employment purposes when the employer employs
"persons who deal with: (a) national security interests; (b) care, custody, or control of chil-
dren; (c) fiduciary trust over money; or (d) health care to children or vulnerable adults");
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-80 (2001) (prohibiting the State of Connecticut from disseminating
arrest records or denying employment based on conviction records); CAL. LAB. CODE
§ 432.7 (West 2001) (prohibiting all employers from using or requesting information relat-
ing to arrests that did not lead to conviction, except for pending violations); HAw. REv.
STAT. § 378-2 (2001) (prohibiting the denial of employment based on arrest record).
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excluded from the hiring pool, raising an inference of racial profiling.7 5 Addi-
tionally, background checks may also implicate the Fair Credit Reporting Act
(FCRA).7 6 If an employer obtains information from a consumer reporting
agency, the employer should (1) obtain prior written consent from the appli-
cant, (2) provide the applicant with a copy of the report if the employer makes
an adverse hiring decision, (3) provide the applicant with the name, address,
and telephone number of the consumer reporting service, and (4) inform the
applicant of the right to dispute the report.77
As long as the employer follows the requirements of FCRA and applicable
state law, while being cautious to avoid a discriminatory effect or purpose,
background checks can be an effective tool to improve workplace safety.
Industry experts estimate that as many as fifteen percent of applicants lie about
criminal convictions.7 8 Private service companies can conduct background
check for employers at a considerable cost.7 9 Many employers must deem this
cost justifiable, given that most employers voluntarily conduct background
checks. The use of background checks communicates to applicants that the
employer only hires desirable candidates, and a failure to conduct background
checks may attract undesirable candidates.8 ° In reducing workplace violence,
background checks attempt to prevent violent employees from entering the
workforce, which will only reduce co-worker/former employee (Type III)
violence.
d. Effective Interviewing
The employer must be particularly careful during the interview process.
The ADA specifically prohibits questions designed to inquire about an appli-
cant's mental disorder. 8' However, an employer could ask questions with a
more limited focus designed to ascertain how the applicant handles stress or
how the applicant would perform job tasks.82 By asking applicants permissible
" Drake, supra note 66, at 3-3; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2000).
76 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000).
77 FTC, Altmeyer Home Stores, Inc., Analysis to Aid Public Comment, 63 Fed. Reg.
15,202-01, 15,203 (Mar. 30, 1998); 15 U.S.C. § 1681(m)(a) (2000).
78 Kelly, supra note 51.
79 See, e.g., AAA Personal Background Checks, available at http://www.aaa-bc.com/back
ground.htm (last visited July 28, 2003) (advertising contact information check and most state
and federal criminal background checks for $103).
80 Kelly, supra note 51 (quoting Kit Fremin, president of Background Check International:
"People will take the path of least resistance .... If you're the only company in town who is
not doing background checks, then don't be surprised when all the dirt bags end up at your
place.").
81 The ADA states: "a covered entity shall not conduct a medical examination or make
inquiries of a job applicant as to whether such applicant is an individual with a disability or
as to the nature or severity of such disability." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2)(A) (2000).
82 One author suggests the following types of questions:
" Tell me about a time you thought you were treated unfairly by your supervisor. How
did you handle it? What did you do or say?
" Have you ever been discharged or disciplined on any job?
" Have you ever been in a fight or argument at work?
" Have you ever been asked to resign a position?
" Have you ever considered leaving a job (or left) as a result of a conflict with a super-
visor or co-worker?
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questions that may uncover an applicant's propensity to react violently, the
employer can add an additional layer of protection at little or no cost.
3. Employee Assistance Programs: A Generalized Preventative
Approach
Employee Assistance Programs (EAPs) can provide valuable benefits to
the employer and employee. EAPs are free, or low-cost, confidential counsel-
ing services for employees, and are usually available through the employer's
health plan.8 3 EAPs can be proactive programs to address an employee's emo-
tional and mental well-being or substance abuse problems. By implementing
an EAP, the employer can improve the productivity and morale of the work
force, as well as improve recruiting.84
EAPs can also provide a safe outlet for employees (either potential victims
or offenders) to discuss frustrations or conflicts. EAPs will help prevent work-
place violence by empowering potential victims of personal relationship (Type
IV) violence to seek assistance and by extinguishing smoldering tempers that
may explode into co-worker/former employee (Type III) violence. 85 The EAP
is a preventative measure that requires voluntary participation from potential
offenders or victims. Because EAPs are confidential and available for all
employees, EAPs are generalized programs that never require the employer to
make individualized determinations about employment. Instead EAPs aim to
ease tension in the workplace and enable employees to receive confidential
assistance.
Depending on relevant economic factors, "the EAP can take many forms:
a hotline; an information and referral service only; a central diagnostic and
referral service; or a consortium that fills these roles for many companies. '"86
Although an EAP will exact some cost on the employer, the employer may save
more in helping to establish a drug-free workplace, improving work perform-
ance of employees, reducing turnover, and improving employee attendance.8 7
For many employers, EAPs pay for themselves while reducing workplace vio-
lence in the process.
4. A Workplace Violence Policy: A Hybrid Preventative and
Corrective Approach
Every company should have a workplace violence policy in place, but the
policy must be carefully drafted. An inflexible policy could remove the
employer's discretion, requiring the employer to retain a violent employee until
* How do you "blow off steam" when you're mad about something?
* What are the three most stressful events you've ever experienced at work and how
did you handle them?
Whitten & Mosley, supra note 18, at 551.
83 Id. at 552; Drake, supra note 66, at 3-5.
84 Whitten & Mosley, supra note 18, at 552.
85 Drake, supra note 66, at 3-5.
86 1 GUIDE TO EMPLOYMENT LAW AND REGULATION § 1.76 (2d ed. 2002).
87 Paula Santonocito, Getting with the Program, HR WIRE, Jan. 14, 2002 (noting that Boe-
ing, Inc. "achieved a minimum 4-to-I savings-to-investment ratio, or an estimated $5.1 mil-
lion, as the result of its EAP, a program that, at the time of the study, served 100,000
employees and 250,000 dependents.").
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a major incident occurs, or requiring the employer to take drastic action when
lesser disciplinary action might be appropriate.88 On the other hand, employers
may relieve liability for discrimination claims by pointing to a non-discrimina-
tory purpose for termination: adherence to the workplace violence policy.89
However, having a workplace violence policy, and poorly applying the policy,
could be worse than not having a workplace violence policy at all. Employers
can face liability if incidents are not appropriately documented, or the employer
does not consistently apply the policy.90 As a result, employers may be wise to
draft a general policy that communicates expectations to employees, but retains
discretion for the employer to decide which disciplinary options are appropri-
ate. 9 1 Given that the Ninth Circuit recently held a community college work-
place violence policy to violate the First Amendment, public employers should
describe violent behavior, particularly threats, with more specificity. 9
Workplace violence policies address solely co-worker/former employee
(Type III) violence. They aim to prevent Type III incidents by deterring co-
worker violence and by authorizing progressive disciplinary measures to pre-
vent an incident from escalating into a more serious incident. Similar to appli-
cation screening, workplace violence policies share characteristics of both
generalized and individualized options to respond to workplace violence. The
policy will apply to all employees, reflecting a generalized option. However, in
applying the policy, employers must make individualized determinations about
retaining and disciplining employees when the policy is violated.
A workplace violence policy can be a beneficial tool for employers
because it reduces liability, helps prevent workplace violence, and imposes few
additional costs. By designing procedures before incidents occur, employers
can save time in addressing problems. The cost of implementing and enforcing
a policy depends on the employer's human resources department and legal
counsel, but the benefits of implementing an appropriate policy are long term.
88 Drake, supra note 66, at 3-5.
89 Muszak v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 63 F. Supp. 2d 292, 299 (W.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding
that adherence to a workplace violence policy was not disability discrimination under the
ADA); Adkins v. U.S. W. Communications, Inc., 181 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1198-99 (D. Colo.
2001) (holding that adherence to a workplace violence policy was not pretext for age dis-
crimination or length-of-service discrimination under the ADEA or ERISA); Wall v. City of
Durham, 169 F. Supp. 2d 466, 478 (M.D.N.C. 2001) (holding that violation of a workplace
violence policy, not prohibited racial discrimination under Title VII, was reason for
termination).
90 Herrick v. Quality Hotels, Inns & Resorts, Inc., 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 203, 208 (Cal. Ct. App.
1993) (affirming judgment for victim-employee because the employer ratified the offender-
employee's conduct by not enforcing the weapons policy); Smith v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger
Corp., 856 F.2d 467, 469-70 (2d Cir. 1988) (reinstating $3.5 million jury verdict based on
the employer's negligent failure to document incidents as required by the company policy).
91 Drake, supra note 66, at 3-5. ,.
92 Bauer v. Sampson, 261 F.3d 775, 785 (9th Cir. 2001). The policy defined workplace
violence as "including, but not limited to, making written, physical, or visual contact with
verbal threats or violent behavior overtones ... ." Id. at 781.
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5. Injunctive Relief Against the Offender: An Individualized
Preventative and Corrective Approach
By suing under trespass theory, the employer could obtain a temporary
restraining order (TRO) or a preliminary injunction against violent offenders.
TROs provide the employer with a purely individualized measure to prevent
the escalation of workplace violence and correct past and present incidents of
workplace violence; a TRO will effectively suspend an employee from the
workplace. Because the measure is individualized, obtaining a TRO requires
the ability to identify potential offenders individually. TROs might only be
practical when used against co-workers/former employees (Type III) and cus-
tomer/clients (Type II), because the employer is aware of these individuals in
the workplace and can foresee future incidents of workplace violence. If a
stranger (Type I) or offender with a personal relationship (Type IV) were
repeatedly engaging in workplace violence in a particular workplace, and the
employer could identify the offender, TROs could also be used to address these
types of workplace violence.
Employers most commonly seek TROs during violent labor disputes,
where a group of individuals may present a threat to the workplace, and not in
classic situations of workplace violence.93 This trend reflects hesitancy by
employers to obtain injunctive relief against violent offenders. A TRO is gen-
erally only available upon a showing of immediate irreparable injury.94 Fur-
thermore, a remedy at law must be inadequate, the employer must have a
reasonable probability of success on the merits of the trespass claim, and the
employer must win a balancing of the equities.95 Even assuming an employer
could show sufficient evidence, obtaining a TRO or preliminary injunction
involves costly procedures which may not be cost-effective for the employer.
Obtaining a TRO generally requires filing a complaint, a memorandum of
points and authorities supporting the injunction, and a proposed injunction.96
After these steps are completed, a TRO will usually expire ten days after its
issuance.9 7 With such limited protection at a great cost, the employer must
preserve the existing TRO for the most critical of workplace emergencies.
93 See, e.g., McCabe Hamilton & Renny Co. v. Chung, 43 P.3d 244 (Haw. 2002) (the peti-
tioner sought a TRO to stop a union member from committing violence and trespassing);
CF&I Steel, L.P. v. United Steel Workers of Am., 23 P.3d 1197 (Colo. 2001) (employer
sought a TRO to enjoin violent and threatening conduct by union members). This author
could not find any reported cases where an employer sought a TRO in response to a typical
example of workplace violence.
94 FED. R. Civ. P. 65(e).
95 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 2.11(2), at 187-88 (2d. ed. 1993).
96 Donald M. Peters, Temporary Restraining Orders and Preliminary Injunctions, ARIz.
Arr'y, Apr. 1995, at 25.
97 FED. R. Civ. P. 65(e) is the federal practice on this issue, and represents state approaches
to the amount of time a TRO remains valid.
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B. Victim Options
1. Temporary Protection Orders (TPOs) Against the Offender: An
Individualized Preventative and Corrective Approach
States routinely authorize TROs by statute to specifically address domestic
violence disputes.9 8 The procedures for obtaining a domestic violence TRO are
streamlined, and because the remedy is statutory, plaintiffs do not have to meet
the irreparable injury requirement or prove that remedies at law are inade-
quate. 99 To avoid confusion with common law TROs, jurisdictions typically
refer to the domestic violence TRO as a temporary protection order (TPO).
Courts typically will issue the TPO with a showing of "good cause" that can be
met by proving an incident of prior abuse.' 0 0 Furthermore, TPOs are procedur-
ally easier to obtain than their common law counterparts. For example, Oregon
will issue TPOs ex parte upon an affidavit of the petitioner, over the telephone,
within one day after the petition is filed.' 0 ' A TPO can prohibit the alleged
batterer from engaging in further abuse or harassment and require the alleged
batterer to discontinue contact with the petitioner, including prohibiting the
offender from entering or approaching the petitioner's workplace or busi-
ness.10 2 A TPO sought by victims against offenders may be an appropriate
response to potential violence by an assailant with a personal relationship to the
victim (Type IV). Similar to a common law TRO that an employer might
obtain, the TPO requires an individualized determination by the victim that the
offender represents a threat. This measure is corrective, because if the TPO is
enforced, future contact by the individual will result in criminal penalties.
However, the TPO is primarily a preventative tool to shield the victim from
future attacks by the offender.
Employers are currently incapable of stepping into the shoes of domestic
violence victims to obtain a TPO. In most states, only the victim of domestic
violence may obtain the TPO; however, frequently victims are reluctant to
apply for a TPO. Victims of domestic violence may be wary to apply for a
TPO because of threats by the batterer, the humiliation of relaying their story of
abuse to others, the inability to afford legal representation, and a belief by vic-
tims that the TPO will be ineffective. 0 3 A few states allow an adult to file an
98 DoBBs, supra note 95, at 170.
99 Id. at 179.
"oo Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered Women:
An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 1035 (1993). The
authors state that:
Statutes define "good cause" to include an emergency, immediate danger, immediate and present
danger of abuse, imminent and present danger of bodily injury, an occurrence of abuse, a sub-
stantial likelihood of imminent danger of abuse, clear and convincing evidence of imminent
danger of abuse, and imminent and present danger to a child. A few states issue temporary
protection orders based on probable cause of imminent and present danger, or on probable cause
of irreparable injury. A temporary protection order may also issue based on the court's reasona-
ble grounds to believe abuse occurred or that an emergency exists.
Id. at 1035-36 (footnotes omitted).
o10 Id. at 1038-39.
102 Id. at 914-20.
103 Mayumi Waddy, DVRO: Just a Piece of Paper, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 81, 83-84
(2000).
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application for a TPO as a surrogate for any other member in the household." °
It appears, however, that states have not extended the standing for a TPO
beyond the household in question.' °5 This jurisdictional issue prevents
employers from utilizing the TPO on behalf of employees affected by domestic
violence.
Even if the victim obtains a TPO, there are limits to the TPO's effective-
ness to prevent violence in the workplace. The TPO can only be enforced if the
violations are reported to the police and the police enforce the TPO. 10 6 Fur-
thermore, TPOs are unlikely to deter those already contemplating criminal con-
duct, such as domestic violence. 10 7 In addition, a TPO may infuriate the
batterer and lead to more violence.'0 8 Despite these limitations, TPOs are
accepted as a beneficial deterrent to domestic violence.'0 9
2. Employer Liability: An Individualized Preventative and Remedial
Approach
Victims have used various theories to assert employer liability for injuries
sustained during incidents of workplace violence. There has been substantial
scholarly work on the diverse nature of claims that plaintiffs might bring fol-
lowing violence in the workplace." 0 Employer liability arguably can be an
effective remedy, because it compensates victims and provides financial incen-
tives for employers to prevent workplace violence. Lawsuits against the
employer address the employer's response to the specific incident of workplace
violence. The employer's response to generalized incidents of workplace vio-
lence may also be relevant, but the lawsuit will address the specific incident,
the specific employer, the specific victim, and the specific offender.
An initial stumbling block for any employee/plaintiff injured in a violent
workplace incident is to avoid the state's workers' compensation exclusive
remedy provision. Under the tort system of the early twentieth century,
employees faced difficult challenges in receiving compensation."' Labor and
management struck a compromise, where the employees received prompt
recovery under the workers' compensation law regardless of fault, and the
1' See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(c) (West 2001).
oI See Klein & Orloff, supra note 100, at 846.
106 Gary Brown et al., Starting a TRO Project: Student Representation of Battered Women,
96 YALE L.J. 1985, 2018 (1987).
107 Richard A. Lingg, Stopping Stalkers: A Critical Examination of Anti-Stalking Statutes,
67 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 347, 360 (1993).
108 Edward S. Snyder, Remedies for Domestic Violence: A Continuing Challenge, 12 J. OF
THE AM. MATRIMONIAL LAWS 335, 346 (1994).
109 Minutes of the Meeting of the Assembly Committee on Judiciary, 71st Sess. 8 (Apr. 5,
2001), available at http://www.leg.state.nv.us/71st/minutes/assembly/jud/final/871 .html (last
visited July 28, 2003).
110 See, e.g., Stephen J. Beaver, Comment, Beyond the Exclusivity Rule: An Employer's
Liability for Workplace Violence, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 103, 106-07 (1997); Ann. E. Phillips,
Comment, Violence in the Workplace: Reevaluating the Employer's Role, 44 BuFF. L. REV.
139 (1996); Whitten & Mosley, supra note 18, at 505.
1 W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 80, at 568, 572,
n.43 (1984) (noting that between seventy and ninety-four percent of workplace injuries were
not compensated).
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employer avoided limitless liability for workplace accidents.' 12 While work-
ers' compensation provides quicker relief for workers, often workers' compen-
sation will not fully compensate the victim, and the victim will attempt to avoid
the exclusive remedy by directly suing the employer."
13
In certain instances, plaintiffs/employees may be able to avoid the work-
ers' compensation system. The workers' compensation scheme applies only
when the injury arises out of the scope of employment." 4 Given this limita-
tion, employers will be open to liability from non-employee victims, including
independent contractors. Employees also may be able to avoid the exclusive
remedy by showing that their claim falls within the intentional tort exception,
which is based on the idea that the workers' compensation exclusive remedy
provision only applies when the worker is injured in the scope of employment
by "accident.""15
However, state laws vary considerably. In three states, an employee can
avoid the workers' compensation scheme if anyone committed an intentional
tort against the employee."l 6 Many states will only allow plaintiffs to avoid the
workers' compensation remedy when the employer acted with the "deliberate
intent" to cause the employee's injuries. 1 17 In some states, if an employer
knows of threats of harm and allows the threats to continue, the conduct can be
described as intentional because the employer is substantially certain that injury
will result." 8 Because of inconsistencies in workers' compensation laws, some
employees will recover more than others.
Plaintiffs who have avoided the workers' compensation bar have recov-
ered damages for their injuries with theories such as negligent hiring," 9 negli-
112 Id. at 574.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 575.
115 Beaver, supra note 110, at 106.
116 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 411(1) (West 2001) (excluding injuries "caused by an act of a
third person intended to injure the employe [sic] because of reasons personal to him, and not
directed against him as an employe [sic] or because of his employment"), Yunker v. Honey-
well, Inc., 496 N.W.2d 419, 424 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that "a violent murder by a
known assailant" is an assault occurring for reasons personal to the victim and not subject to
workers' compensation's exclusive remedy provision); Shutters v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 795
S.W.2d 800, 802-03 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (stating that assault is not covered by workers'
compensation if the assault is not connected to the scope of employment or if the assault
occurred for reasons personal to the employee and assailant). California specifically
addressed the treatment of workers' compensation for cases involving workplace violence by
lowering the causation requirement for recovery under the workers' compensation law.
Lockheed Martin v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 865, 871 & n.7 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2002) (interpreting CAL. LAB. CODE § 3208.3 (West 2001)).
117 Michelle Gorton, Comment, Intentional Disregard: Remedies for the Toxic Workplace,
30 ENVTL. L. 811, 820 & n.65 (2000) (citing Davis v. U. S. Employers Council, Inc., 934
P.2d 1132, 1148-49 (Or. Ct. App. 1997).
118 Id. at 841 (describing workers' compensation law in Ohio, Louisiana, Michigan, North
Carolina, and West Virginia).
119 See generally Whitten & Mosley, supra note 18, at 520-21 (footnotes omitted) (stating
that a negligent hiring claim requires a showing that: "(1) the employee in fact had a propen-
sity for violence; (2) the employer knew or should have known of the propensity for vio-
lence; and (3) the employer hired the employee negligently or with callous disregard for the
rights of persons who would reasonably be expected to come into contact with the
employee.").
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gent supervision, 12 negligent retention, 12 and voluntary assumption of a duty
to protect. 22 However, the only effect employer liability has on the incidents
of workplace violence is to encourage employers to use existing options to
prevent and control workplace violence. Employer liability does not advance
the potential to prevent workplace violence, but only creates incentives for
employers to provide as much protection as the law requires. Moreover,
because of inconsistent workers' compensation laws, some employers have
greater incentives than others to fully utilize the employer options.
C. The Government Option (OSHA): A Generalized Preventative Approach
A final interested party in reducing workplace violence is the federal
agency authorized to enforce workplace safety, the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA). All private employers are subject to the Occu-
pational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSH Act), 123 which OSHA enforces.
Failure to comply with the OSH Act can result in stiff penalties.124 The OSH
Act imposes a "general duty" on employers to "furnish to each of [its] employ-
ees employment and a place of employment which are free from recognized
hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to
[its] employees."' 25 OSHA has applied the general duty clause to workplace
violence, citing employers for violations in response to incidents of workplace
violence. 1
26
OSHA also issued specific guidelines encouraging employers to develop a
"violence prevention program" based on five central elements: (1) management
commitment and employee involvement, (2) worksite analysis, (3) hazard pre-
vention and control, (4) safety and health training, and (5) evaluation.' 27 How-
120 Id. at 530 (noting that employers may be liable when an employee commits a "wrongful
act" and the employer negligently or recklessly supervised the employee).
121 Id. at 527-28 (noting that employers negligently retain employees when they have actual
or constructive notice of an employee's violent behavior).
122 Employers that undertake to protect the workplace can actually increase their liability if
harm results from a "failure to exercise reasonable care to protect [the] undertaking, if (a)
[the employer's] failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such harm, or (b)
[the employer] has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third person, or (c)
the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third person upon the undertak-
ing." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (1976).
123 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (2000). Section 652(5) excludes the United States govern-
ment and state governments from the scope of the OSH Act.
124 See id. § 666 (an employer can be fined anywhere from $5,000 to $70,000 for a willful
violation and as much as $7,000 for non-willful and non-serious violations).
125 Id. § 654(a).
126 See, e.g., Sec'y of Labor v. Megawest Fin., Inc., 17 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1337 (ALJ
1995) (reversing violation of general duty clause because the hazard of workplace violence -
tenants attacking landlords - was not recognized by Megawest or its industry). While
Megawest was ultimately successful, this case demonstrates OSHA's willingness to apply
the general duty clause to incidents of workplace violence. States have also cited companies
for workplace violence. See, e.g., Nation in Brief, WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 2000, at A9 (noting
that Hawaii cited Xerox Corp. for "failing to enforce workplace violence policies" in
response to an incident where an employee fatally shot seven co-workers).
127 OSHA, GUIDELINES FOR PREVENTING WORKPLACE VIOLENCE FOR HEALTH-CARE AND
SOCIAL-SERVICE WORKERS, 4 (2003) (available on the OSHA government website at: http://
www.osha.gov/Publications/osha3148.pdf) (last visited Aug. 2, 2003).
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ever, OSHA has declared that it will not cite employers for violations of the
general duty clause because of a failure to institute a "violence protection pro-
gram."' 28 These standards are merely advisory "best practices" that employers
may use to prevent workplace violence. 29 Employers should take note that if
the advisements are "best practices," it would be difficult to find that an
employer utilizing the advisements violated the "general duty" clause.
In the status quo, OSHA only affects workplace violence by advising
employers how to reduce violence, and by fining employers for violations of
the general duty clause. OSHA appears to concentrate on late-night retailers
and health care workers, which might help reduce violence from strangers
(Type I) and violence from customer/clients (Type II), since Type I and Type II
offenders are most likely to target these respective establishments.' 3 0 Because
OSHA's specific advisements are completely voluntary, OSHA fails to play a
sizable role in reducing workplace violence, and will only represent a reminder
to employers of their duty to provide a safe workplace under the general duty
clause.
IV. THE NEWEST APPROACH TO WORKPLACE VIOLENCE: PANACEA,
BAND-AID, OR FAILURE?
This section will address the employer TRO as a response to workplace
violence. Initially, this section will examine the substantive law of the
employer TRO as it has been applied in California, Arizona, and Nevada. After
comparing the three laws, this section argues that the employer TRO will com-
plement existing approaches to workplace violence by filling important gaps in
current approaches and further reducing workplace violence. In addition, this
section argues that the employer TRO will not materially increase the
employer's risk of liability. While the employer TRO may disrupt some
existing laws and have a limited effect on workplace violence, this section
argues that the strengths of the employer TRO outweigh the weaknesses and
that employer TROs should be adopted in other states.
A. The Substantive Law of the Employer TRO
1. California's Workplace Violence Safety Act
In 1994, California passed the Workplace Violence Safety Act, becoming
the first state to authorize an employer TRO for workplace violence."3 The
Act intended to provide employers with an equivalent power to obtain a TRO
in response to workplace violence as is provided to victims of harassment and
domestic violence.' 3 2 The Act allows an employer to obtain a TRO to enjoin
illegal acts or threats of violence in response to any "credible threat of vio-
128 Letter from Joseph A. Dear, Asst. Secretary of OSHA, to Hon. Christopher S. Bond,
Chairman of the Comm. on Small Business, US Senate (Aug. 29, 1996), available at http://
www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show document?p table=INTERPRETATIONS&p-id
=22248&pjtext_version=FALSE (last visited July 28, 2003).
129 Id.
130 Id.
'' CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 527.8 (West 2000).
132 See Scripps Health v. Marin, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 86, 93, n.8 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
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lence" directed at an employee.133 A "credible threat of violence" includes any
"knowing and willful statement or course of conduct that would place a reason-
able person in fear for his or her safety, or the safety of his or her immediate
family, and that serves no legitimate purpose."' 134
The procedure for an employer to obtain a TRO is relatively inexpensive
and undemanding. An employer can obtain a TRO, lasting for fifteen days,
upon an affidavit showing that the employer is entitled to the TRO.135 There is
no filing fee to petition for a TRO, nor is there a requirement to post a bond.' 36
The employer may extend the TRO up to three years, after a hearing, if a judge
determines by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant "engaged in
unlawful violence or made a credible threat of violence."' 137 A court has fur-
ther construed this provision to require a finding by clear and convincing evi-
dence that a failure to issue the injunction would subject the employee to
further violence or threats. 138 The court imposed this additional standard
because applying the statute literally would effectively require a stronger show-
ing for an ex parte TRO than a permanent injunction.' 39
In addition, the statute professes not to alter the existing duty, "if any," to
provide a safe workplace.' 4 ° Thus, the statute should not expand any common
law duty to employees or impose additional requirements to abide by the OSH
Act's "general duty" clause. In the eight years that the law has existed, no
cases have been reported where an employer incurred liability as a result of
using, misusing, or failing to use the employer TRO.
2. Arizona's Injunction Against Workplace Harassment
Arizona, building off of California's experience with the employer TRO,
drafted similar legislation which became effective in 2001.' The Arizona
injunction against workplace harassment allows employers to obtain injunc-
tions in response to workplace harassment, defined as "a single threat or act of
physical harm or damage or a series of acts over any period of time that would
133 CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 527.8(a).
134 Id. § 527.8(b)(2).
"I Id. § 527.8(e).
136 Id. § 527.8(o).
137 Id. § 527.8(f). Note, however, that section (f) provides that a plaintiff may "apply for a
renewal of the injunction by filing a new petition for an injunction" at any time within three
months of the injunction's expiration.
131 See Scripps Health, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 94. The Scripps Health court observed that a
literal reading of the statute would not require a showing that "great or irreparable harm
would result to the employee due to the likelihood the unlawful violence would recur." Id.
While this evidence is required for issuing an ex parte TRO, the statute does not explicitly
require this for the issuance of a permanent injunction. Id. See also CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE
§ 527.8(e) & (f).
139 Scripps Health, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 94.
140 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 527.8(k). This provision is a prime example of a heavy-handed
approach to prevent any additional employer liability because of the employer TRO. "Noth-
ing in this section may be construed as expanding, diminishing, altering, or modifying the
duty, if any, of an employer to provide a safe workplace for employees and other persons."
Id.
141 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-1810 (2001) (enacted by 2000 Ariz. Sess. Laws, Ch. 72 § 1).
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cause a reasonable person to be seriously alarmed or annoyed."' 42 This harass-
ment could be directed towards the employer or any other person who enters
the workplace such as customers, employees, or independent contractors. 1
43
The procedure for an employer to obtain an Arizona injunction is stream-
lined and affordable. Upon a successful petition for a TRO, the employer may
enjoin the defendant from approaching the employer's property or contacting
the employer or any other person in the workplace.'" Applications for a TRO
are subject to filing fees, but the petitioner does not have to post a bond. 145 To
obtain a TRO, an employer must submit an affidavit that avers facts entitling
the employer to a workplace harassment TRO.' 4 6 A court will issue the TRO
ex parte if the court "finds reasonable evidence of workplace harassment by the
defendant or that good cause exists to believe that great or irreparable harm
would result.., if the injunction is not granted before the defendant.., can be
heard . . . .,,4 This language departs from the common law of injunctions,
because a TRO could be issued absent a showing of irreparable harm.
14 8
The TRO will last a full year from service upon the defendant, and the
plaintiff may take up to a year to serve the defendant with the TRO. 149 Thus,
by delaying service, an employer can effectively preserve the possibility of
injunctive relief for up to two years. However, a defendant may attempt to
quash the TRO by requesting a hearing at any time while the injunction is
effective. 150 Violations of the TRO can result in prosecution for "the crime of
interfering with judicial proceedings" in addition to any other crimes that the
defendant may commit in disobeying the order.' 5 '
The Arizona statute insulates peace officers and employers from civil lia-
bility. Employers are held immune from liability for "seeking or failing to seek
an injunction" under the Arizona statute.15 2 The civil liability immunity provi-
sion contains an exemption for liability arising from the seeking of an injunc-
tion "primarily to accomplish a purpose for which the injunction was not
designed."' 53 Because of the malleability of legislative purpose, the civil
immunity provision may not provide the amount of immunity that employers
expect. The statute further prohibits the admission of evidence regarding the
employer TRO as an admission of the employer; however, statements or
actions made by the employer in filing for the TRO may be used for impeach-
ment purposes. ' 54 In addition, the statute does not modify the duty to provide a
142 Id. § 12-1810(R)(2).
143 Id. § 12-1810(C)(3).
144 Id. § 12-1810(F)(1).
145 Id. § 12-1810(D).
146 Id. § 12-1810(A), (C)(3).
147 Id. § 12-1810(E) (emphasis added).
148 Id.
149 Id. § 12-1810(I).
150 Id. § 12-1810(G) ("At any time during the period that the injunction is in effect, the
defendant may request a hearing .... After the hearing, the court may modify, quash or
continue the injunction.").
'5' Id. § 12-1810(H).
152 Id. § 12-1810(P).
153 Id.
154 Id.
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safe workplace.' 5 5 At a minimum, the employer's liability does not appear to
expand with the passage of the statute authorizing TROs for workplace
harassment.
3. Nevada's Order for Protection Against Harassment in the
Workplace
Nevada followed in California and Arizona's footsteps on June 13,
2001.156 Nevada's order for protection allows employers to obtain injunctive
relief in response to harassment that may be directed against anyone present in
the workplace, such as employees, independent contractors, and customers. 157
The definition of harassment covers threats of injury or actual injury to person,
property, or the mental health or safety of a person. 158 This broad definition of
harassment is limited by a requirement that the "threat would cause a reasona-
ble person to fear that the threat will be carried out or the act would cause a
reasonable person to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated or harassed."' 15 9
The procedure a Nevada employer must use to obtain an employer TRO is
accessible and economical. Initially an employer must apply for a temporary
order for protection against harassment in the workplace with an application
describing the events comprising the harassment. 160 If the court finds that the
events occurred and the petitioner provided the defendant with notice, then the
court can issue an injunction.' 6 ' This injunction could issue without notice to
the defendant if, based on an accompanying affidavit averring the events of
harassment, the court finds: (1) immediate and irreparable injury; (2) a loss or
damage to an employer or another in the workplace will occur without the
injunction; and (3) appropriate attempts have been made to provide notice to
the defendant. 162 In either case, with or without notice, the court has the dis-
cretion to require a hearing before the temporary order will be issued. 163 Addi-
tionally, the temporary order will not issue without the posting of a bond."6
If the court issues a TRO, the defendant will be enjoined from contacting a
person in the workplace or approaching the workplace for fifteen days follow-
ing the issuance. 165 A court may extend the TRO for up to a year upon an
application for a hearing by a petitioner. 166 A defendant, at any time, may also
petition for a hearing to modify or quash the TRO.167 Once the defendant has
been served with the TRO, officers can enforce the TRO without witnessing a
155 Id. § 12-1810(K)(1).
156' See 2001 NEV. STAT. 566 §§ 1-19 (enacted as NEV. REV. STAT. 33.200-360 (2002)).
157 NEV. REV. STAT. § 33.240(2) (2001).
158 Id. § 33.240(1)(a)-(c).
159 Id. § 33.270(3).
160 Id. § 33.250.
161 Id. § 33.270(1)-(2).
162 Id. § 33.270(4).
163 Id. § 33.270(3).
164 Id. § 33.270(2).
165 Id. §§ 33.270(5), 33.280(1).
166 Id. § 33.270(6)-(8).
167 Id. § 33.270(9). Section (9) requires a defendant to give the employer two days notice
of such a hearing.
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violation, so long as they have probable cause to believe the defendant violated
the order. 1
68
Nevada also includes a civil immunity provision, protecting employers
and peace officers operating under the statute. Employers are immune from
civil liability for failing to seek an order, or for seeking such an order, unless
the order was sought in bad faith. 169 Furthermore, any acts or statements made
under the statute will not be admissible as an admission of the employer or for
impeachment.' 7 ° In addition, the employer TRO disclaims any modification of
"the duty of the employer to provide a safe workplace."'
' 7 1
4. A Comparison of the California, Arizona, and Nevada Employer
TRO
Each state's attempt to authorize employer TROs share similar character-
istics. The central similarity linking these three statutes is that each statute
gives an employer standing to obtain a TRO in response to workplace vio-
lence.'72 Each state limits its statute to incidents that would alarm a "reasona-
ble person" and would include situations where individuals have threatened
others, but not engaged in violent conduct. 173 Each state also provides that the
employer TRO does not alter the existing duty to provide a safe workplace. 17
Finally, each TRO can be obtained ex parte with a sufficient affidavit.1
75
Despite these similarities, there are noticeable differences among the three
state statutes. The coverage of Nevada's statute is slightly broader than the
California and Arizona statutes because it includes property damage as well as
actual psychological injury.' 76 The Nevada and Arizona statutes are broader
than California's statute because they allow employers to step into the shoes of
anyone in the workplace, not just employees.' 77
The procedural requirements of the employer TROs also vary considera-
bly. California and Arizona do not require the issuance of a bond by the peti-
tioner, whereas Nevada requires a bond before a court can issue a TRO.
178
Additionally, California does not require any filing fee when applying for the
TRO. 17 9 The California and Nevada TRO will only last for fifteen days, and
168 Id. § 33.320(1).
169 Id. § 33.340(1).
170 Id. § 33.340(2).
171 Id. § 33.360.
172 Compare CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 527.8 (West 2000), with ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-
1810(A) (2001), and NEV. REV. STAT. § 33.250.
113 Compare CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 527.8(b)(2), with ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-1810(R)(2),
and NEV. REV. STAT. § 33.240(1), (3).
14 Compare CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 527.8(k), with ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-1810(K)(1),
and NEV. REV. STAT. § 33.360(1).
15 Compare CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 527.8(e), with ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-1810(A) & (E),
and NEV. REV. STAT. § 33.270(4).
176 Compare NEV. REV. STAT. § 33.240(1)(b), with CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 527.8(a), and
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-1810(R)(2).
177 Compare NEV. REV. STAT. § 33.240(2), and ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-1810(E), with CAL.
CIv. PROC. CODE § 527.8(a).
178 Compare ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-1810, and CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 527.8, with NEV.
REV. STAT. § 33.270(2).
179 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 527.8(o).
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can be extended for three years and one year respectively, whereas Arizona's
TRO can effectively last for up to two years without a special hearing for
extension. 180 California's extension process requires a stronger showing of the
need to extend the TRO,"8 ' whereas little guidance has been given to Nevada
courts as to the burden that employers must meet to extend a TRO.1
82
A final area where the statutes diverge is on the issue of civil immunity.
California relies on disclaiming any modification of the duty to provide a safe
workplace to protect employers.1 83 Arizona provides complete civil immunity
under the statute, unless the employer sought a TRO for a purpose other than to
prevent harassment.' 84 In a similar vein, Nevada's civil immunity provision is
absolute unless the employer sought a TRO in bad faith.185
B. Strengths of the Employer TRO
1. What's New About the Employer TRO?
The employer TRO is a new approach to an old problem. A review of the
existing approaches to workplace violence reveal glaring deficiencies in the
types of approaches available. The employer TRO is an individualized pre-
ventative and corrective measure which clearly distinguishes the TRO from
generalized preventative measures, such as EAPs or enhanced physical secur-
ity, because generalized preventative measures do little to address an imminent
incident of workplace violence. While applicant screening can involve individ-
ualized decisions, these decisions are also made before an incident occurs and
cannot address an imminent incident. All three options can be fairly classified
as options that must be implemented and utilized well before an incident esca-
lates to violence. While these options are important to the overall prevention of
workplace violence, they do not provide relief similar to the employer TRO.
Two other options - employer liability and OSHA action - are post-inci-
dent remedies which will not aid the prevention of a specific incident of work-
place violence because they address specific incidents only after they have
occurred. By establishing a financial cost for failure to appropriately respond
to workplace violence, these options affect employer resolution of incidents by
providing incentives to make full use of the options available. OSHA may also
provide information to facilitate further development of security and other
internal measures. However, these options do not, in and of themselves, enable
employers to undertake further measures to address workplace violence. These
measures only encourage employers to use existing approaches to workplace
violence. While these incentives are important to insure that employers use
appropriate methods to control workplace violence, they address the problem
from a different angle than the employer TRO.
18o Compare CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 527.8, and NEV. REV. STAT. § 33.270, with ARIZ.
REV. STAT. § 12-1810; see supra note 150 and accompanying text.
181 Scripps Health v. Marin, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 86, 93 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999); CAL. Civ. PROC.
CODE § 527.8(e) & (f).
182 NEV. REV. STAT. § 33.270(6) & (7).
183 CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 527.8(k).
184 ARIz. REV. STAT. § 12-1810(P).
185 NEV. REV. STAT. § 33.340(1).
Fall 2003]
NEVADA LAW JOURNAL
There are three approaches to workplace violence that do address the
problem from a similar angle as the employer TRO; nonetheless, the employer
TRO provides a substantially new option. Workplace violence policies attempt
to set a general norm for appropriate behavior in the workplace and prescribe
repercussions for failing to meet the norm. 186 An employer TRO is similar in
that it subjects individuals to a general norm of conducting themselves appro-
priately, so as not to cause apprehension in a "reasonable person." Failure to
meet this norm will result in an injunction, enjoining the individual from enter-
ing the workplace. The employer TRO is an extension of the workplace vio-
lence policy, but it still has a role to play. The workplace violence policy will
only affect co-worker (Type III) violence. In Arizona and Nevada, the
employer TRO has broader coverage in that it could potentially apply to co-
worker (Type III), customer (Type II), and personal relationship (Type IV) vio-
lence.' 8 7 Additionally, the most severe punishment a workplace violence pol-
icy can impose is termination. TROs, on the other hand, extend beyond
termination and provide employers with post-employment relief. Finally,
employer TROs provide a legal deterrent as opposed to an economic deterrent.
The employer TRO shares many similarities with the common law TRO
that an employer might be able to obtain, based on a trespass claim, and the
temporary protection order that a potential domestic violence victim might
obtain. The need for the employer TRO has arisen because the employer lacks
standing to obtain a TPO,188 and a common law TRO would be too burden-
some to be cost-effective. For example, when a depressed employee of the
University of Washington posed a threat to the workplace amid news that he
was shopping for a gun, the employer attempted to do everything within its
legal power to diffuse the situation. 189 The director of the residency program
stated, "We didn't have enough to get a restraining order.... [blut we could
have said 'You're Fired.' The fear was that if we fired him right then, he
would kill himself."' 90 This employer could have used an intermediary
approach, like the employer TRO, without having to terminate the employee.
Under the existing law, the employer was unable to obtain the TRO, whereas
an employer TRO statute might have authorized a TRO in this incident. Fur-
thermore, the employer TRO need not be based on a tort claim, and presents a
legally relaxed standard to issue the TRO.'91 The employer TRO is intended to
specifically address workplace violence. While a domestic violence victim
might obtain a TPO that could be effective in the workplace, evidence suggests
that many victims are reluctant to do so and may not notify their employer of
the TRO. 19
2
186 See discussion supra Part III.A.4.
187 See discussion supra Part IV.A.4.
188 Minutes of the Senate Committee on Judiciary, 71st Sess. 15 (May 9, 2001), available at
http://www.leg.state.nv.us/71st/minutes/senate/jud/final/1332.html (last visited July 28,
2003).
189 Susan Kelleher & Eli Sanders, Troubled Resident's Case Left UW With Quandary,
SEATYLE TIMES, July 5, 2000, at Al.
190 Id.
'' See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 527.8(a) (West 2001) (authorizing a TRO for a show-
ing of a credible threat of violence).
192 See discussion supra Part III.B.1.
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A final attribute of the employer TRO that separates it from all existing
options is that it is relatively risk-free. The Nevada and Arizona civil immunity
provisions allow employers responding to workplace violence to consider the
use of an employer TRO without the fear of a lawsuit from offenders or poten-
tial victims.' 9 3 Each current option available to the employer must be exer-
cised cautiously to avoid liability, but the Nevada and Arizona TROs are risk-
free as long as an employer seeking a TRO acts in good faith.
2. The Effectiveness of the Employer TRO to Reduce Workplace
Violence
The employer TRO, as an intermediary step between pre-incident and
post-incident prevention, provides an effective tool for employers to address
workplace violence. Initially, it is worth noting that workplace violence is ordi-
narily preventable. In 99.9% of violent workplace incidents, warning signs are
present. 9 4 "Workplace harassment and violence are probably the most pre-
ventable workplace injuries or stressors .... [E]mployers should act against
perpetrators of small incidents to prevent worse ones from occurring."195
Employer TROs can be used to act against these small incidents before they
become severe incidents.
Evidence suggests that employer TROs have helped to diffuse small situa-
tions. For example, when an employee was being stalked by an ex-boyfriend,
the employer was able to end the stalking by obtaining a temporary restraining
order.' 96 Where TPOs have failed in the past, employer TROs may succeed.
Employers who obtain TROs are more motivated to prosecute violations of the
TROs, whereas a recent study indicates that 87.7% of female domestic abuse
victims fail to file contempt motions after violations of the TRO.' 9 7 The
employer often has greater resources and police may treat the employer's
charges more seriously than the domestic violence victim.' 98 TRO statutes also
allow arrests by police officers regardless of whether the officer observed the
violation.' 99 One of the most important effects of an employer TRO is that it
will enable earlier police involvement and will prompt a visit by a police
officer to serve the TRO. 2° This visit can diffuse the potential offender's frus-
193 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-1810(P) (2001); NEV. REV. STAT. § 33.340(1) (2001).
194 Whitten & Mosley, supra note 18, at 506.
'I Julie Gannon Shoop, Workplace Violence Affects Millions, Survey Finds, TRIAL, Dec.
1993, at 76.
196 Mary J. Pitzer, Taking Steps to Protect Employees Amid Rising Workplace Violence,
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1997, at D5 (declaring that "[h]arassing phone calls stopped, and the
crisis subsided").
197 Kristen Go, Most Restraining Orders Work, But They Must Be Backed By Action, DEN-
VER POST, Sept. 12, 1999, at BI.
198 See Nancy Egan, The Police Response to Spouse Abuse: A Selective, Annotated Bibliog-
raphy, 91 LAW. LIBR. J. 499, 506 (1999) (citing research suggesting that police officers
prefer mediation over arrest upon the belief that most domestic violence victims do not
desire that their spouse be arrested).
199 See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT § 33.320(1) (2001).
200 Minutes of the Senate Committee on Judiciary, 71st Sess. 15 (May 9, 2001), available at
http://www.leg.state.nv.usn7lst/minutes/senate/jud/final/1332.html (last visited July 28,
2003); Ilana DeBare, Companies Can Defend Themselves Against Workplace Violence, S.F.
CHRON., Mar. 24, 1998, at Cl.
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tration and cause the offender to reconsider plotted acts of violence in the
workplace.20 1 Where contact with an individual in the workplace or presence
in the workplace might not ordinarily be a crime, the action will constitute a
crime when it directly violates a TRO. Employers will have the full force of
law behind them when they report violations of the TRO. As a whole,
restraining orders are more beneficial than harmful in the prevention of vio-
lence.2 °2 Employers in California tend to agree, as applications for employer
TROs have escalated steadily since 1998.203
C. Weaknesses of the Employer TRO
1. Disruption of Current Laws
Anytime a new body of law enters an existing body of law, conflicts in the
laws must be resolved. Because the employer TRO creates a new body of law
and does not stem from an existing body of law, one major weakness is that it
will disrupt current employment laws. It could affect both the law on sexual
harassment and arbitration orders.
a. Sexual Harassment: Faragher/Ellerth Defense
Employers face civil liability under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 for sexual harassment if the employer "fail[s] or refuse[s] to hire or to
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual
with respect to ... compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment, because of such individual's ... sex.' '2 ' The Supreme Court has inter-
preted this provision to prohibit both quid pro quo sexual harassment and
hostile work environment discrimination. 20 5 To prevail on a hostile work envi-
ronment claim, the plaintiff must show that the "workplace [was] permeated
with 'discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult,' that [was] 'sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [her] employment . '...'"206
Hostile work environment claims can overlap with incidents of workplace
violence. For example, in Susko v. Romano's Macaroni Grill,2 °7 when an
employee reported incidents of sexual harassment to a supervisor, the harasser
threatened the plaintiff with physical violence and repeated unwanted physical
contact such as squeezing the employee's side. 208 The plaintiff survived sum-
mary judgment on a hostile work environment sexual harassment claim based
partially on the violent threat, because "the threat of physical violence is mate-
rial to a subjective and objective determination of whether a hostile work envi-
201 Minutes of the Senate Committee on Judiciary, 71st Sess. 15 (May 9, 2001), available at
http://www.leg.state.nv.usFlst/minutes/senate/jud/final/1332.html (last visited July 28,
2003).
202 Go, supra note 197, at Bl.
203 See Tracy Wilson, Workplace Restraining Orders on the Increase, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 20,
2000, at B1.
204 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (2000).
205 Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986).
206 Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (citations omitted).
207 142 F. Supp. 2d 333 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).
208 Id. at 335.
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ronment existed."2 °9 This is an example of co-worker (Type III) violence.
Because hostile work environment claims can also be actionable as a result of
harassment by customers,2 10 physical violence by customers (Type II) may also
affect a hostile work environment claim.
Regardless of the effect of workplace violence on hostile work environ-
ment claims, an employer could still use the employer TRO in response to
sexual harassment. In Nevada and Arizona, harassment is specifically men-
tioned as a covered act. Likewise, California issues TROs in response to cer-
tain harassment involving assault, battery, or stalking.2 1 1
In 1998, the Supreme Court announced an affirmative defense to hostile
work environment claims in the companion decisions of Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton2t 2 and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth.2 13 Under these cases,
an employer can successfully defend against a hostile work environment sexual
harassment claim by showing:
(a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any
sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed
to take advantage of any preventative or corrective opportunities provided by the
employer or to avoid harm otherwise."
2 14
This defense may not be available to an employer whose supervisor cre-
ated the hostile work environment. 215 However, if the hostile work environ-
ment claim is based on a customer (Type II) or co-worker (Type III) incident,
the defense is available to employers against sexual harassment claim.
If an employer TRO applied in the jurisdiction, plaintiffs/employees could
attempt to defeat a Faragher defense by arguing that the employer did not
obtain a TRO to end the harassment. A TRO could even be fashioned to allow
the employee or customer access to the worksite, but prevent them from mak-
ing contact with the harassed employee. Even if the employer took some
action, the employee could argue that the employer did not take enough action
because the TRO could have legally enforced any instructions to discontinue
sexual harassment. If TROs are inexpensive or free, provide prompt relief, are
easy to obtain, and are effective, then an employer that failed to obtain a TRO
in response to harassment may be unable to persuade a jury that they "exercised
209 Id. at 338.
210 See, e.g., Lockhard v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 162 F.3d 1062, 1072 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding
that harassment by customers was sufficiently severe and pervasive to justify a hostile work
environment claim).
211 NEV. REV. STAT. § 33.240 (2001) (defining harassment as including bodily injury or
"[s]ubstantial harm to the physical or mental health or safety of a person"); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
§ 12-1810(R)(2) (2001) (defining harassment as "a single threat or act of physical harm or
damage or a series of acts ... that would cause a reasonable person to be seriously alarmed
or annoyed"); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 527.8(b)(l)-(2) (West 2001) (defining unlawful vio-
lence as "any assault or battery, or stalking," and defining credible threat of violence as a
"knowing and willful statement or course of conduct that would place a reasonable person in
fear for his or her safety [or that of his or her family]").
212 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
213 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
214 See, e.g., Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
215 Id. at 807-08.
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reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing
behavior." 2 6
Employers in Nevada and Arizona might respond that they are immune
from civil liability under the statute; however, this response would likely fail.
Plaintiffs could argue that the immunity provision does not apply because the
liability is based on the sexual harassment experienced, not the employer's fail-
ure to respond properly with a TRO. The Faragher defense does not create
civil liability; rather, as a defense, it removes pre-existing civil liability under a
hostile work environment sexual harassment claim.
Employers in California, unable to claim the civil immunity defense, will
have to rely on the disclaimer of modifying the duty to maintain a safe work-
place, arguing they did not violate their duty of reasonable care. Attempting to
shield the employer with the modification clause may be rejected by a review-
ing court; the clause appears to apply to the general duty to provide a safe
workplace, not an individualized duty to respond to sexual harassment. The
clause reads: "[n]othing in this section may be construed as expanding, dimin-
ishing, altering, or modifying the duty, if any, of an employer to provide a safe
workplace for employees and other persons." '2 17 Furthermore, the plaintiff may
not be arguing that the workplace was unsafe, but that working conditions
changed as a result of the hostile work environment. The resolution of whether
the employer exercised due care will be fact-based. Typically, the employer
meets its duty of care if it has a sexual harassment policy in place and quickly
responds with remedial action to a complaint of sexual harassment.21 8 How-
ever, these components are not, as a matter of law, the exercise of reasonable
care, 2 19 and prior decisions would have assumed that the employer could not
have obtained an employer TRO. The possibility remains that a failure to
obtain an employer TRO might impair a Faragher defense.
Conversely, employers who obtained TROs may attempt to use the issu-
ance of the TRO as evidence that they met their duty of reasonable care. While
this evidence may be relevant, it will not, in and of itself, meet the first prong
of the Faragher test because the employer must generally have a complaint
procedure in place to ensure that it learns of workplace violence incidents.22 °
Furthermore, it would not be advisable for an employer to respond to every
incident of sexual harassment with a TRO.
In resolving this issue, courts should refrain from admitting evidence
about the failure of an employer to obtain a TRO in evaluating the Faragher
defense when the harasser is an employee. Allowing such evidence would, in
effect, give employees in one state more protection from sexual harassment
under a federal statute than another state. Furthermore, sanctions against
employees, such as firing or suspension, will have the same effect on sexual
harassment as an employer TRO, because both remove the harasser from the
workplace. The use of these sanctions are already evaluated in the Faragher
defense. As such, the failure of an employer to obtain an employer TRO would
216 Id. at 807.
217 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 527.8(k) (West 2001).
218 See, e.g., Robles v. Cox & Co., Inc., 154 F. Supp. 2d 795, 804-05 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
219 Id.
220 Id.
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not aid the factfinder in determining if the employer used reasonable care.
Even if the employer retained the employee, but obtained a limited TRO to
enjoin contact with the victim, this measure would not deter sexual harassment
any more than if the employee believed the employer would terminate him
upon another incident of sexual harassment.
If the harasser is not an employee, consideration of an employer's failure
to obtain a TRO may be relevant and helpful in an analysis of whether the
employer exercised reasonable care. While the employer can refuse to serve
the customer, or prohibit the customer from being in the workplace, this may
not present a serious deterrent to a customer. If a customer continues to enter
the workplace and harass an employee, an employer TRO may not only be
proper but also reasonable.
If the employer obtains a TRO against a harasser and wishes to introduce
this evidence on the issue of reasonable care, courts should consider the evi-
dence, but not presume reasonable care simply because the employer obtained
the TRO. While creating a presumption of reasonable care may provide an
added incentive for employers to use TROs to address sexual harassment, the
incentive does not disappear by only making the evidence relevant. In fact, it
would place the decision in a proper balance - motivating the employer to
evaluate when a TRO might be appropriate and when a TRO would not be
appropriate - instead of creating an incentive for employers to categorically
respond to sexual harassment with TROs. Even if an employer responded to
sexual harassment with a TRO, this does not demonstrate that the employer
exercised due care. The employer should still be required to have a procedure
in place to address complaints and respond with prompt corrective action.
Without such a requirement, employers cannot be deemed to have taken appro-
priate action to become aware of sexual harassment, which is as important as
taking appropriate action when learning of complaints.
b. Effects on Arbitration Orders
California's Workplace Violence Safety Act demonstrated an unusual side
effect on arbitration orders. In the incident described in the introduction to this
article - involving Danton Camm and his threat to shoot a co-worker, the co-
worker's wife, and the co-worker's new baby if the City of Palo Alto fired
Camm 22 1 - the TRO proved to disable any arbitration ordering reinstatement.
The City of Palo Alto, Camm's employer, obtained an employer TRO prior to
dismissing Camm.22 2 An arbitrator ordered that Camm be reinstated and
ordered backpay based on finding that Camm would not act on his threat and
that the City violated Camm's right to appropriate notice, right to union repre-
sentation, and right to a full and fair investigation.2 23 A court subsequently
overturned the order, although agreeing with the arbitrator's findings, because
reinstatement would violate the public policy of obeying judicial orders.22 4
221 City of Palo Alto v. Serv. Employees Int'l Union, 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d 500, 502 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1999).
222 Id. at 503.
223 Id.
224 Id. at 507-08.
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Whether this side effect will manifest itself in Nevada and Arizona remains to
be seen.
While on the one hand City of Palo Alto correctly holds that an arbitration
decision should not be able to quash a lawfully issued TRO, the decision sug-
gests that the employer TRO produces an inequitable result. Although based
on sound legal principles, the decision removes a remedy to address a legal
wrong. If the arbitrator correctly found that Camm did not pose a threat to the
workplace, and that Camm's employer removed him without cause, the
employer would be able to escape its duty under the collective bargaining
agreement to properly investigate claims of misconduct by successfully
obtaining a TRO prior to dismissal. While reinstatement would also have been
an improper result, an order for backpay would have retained some incentive
for employers to follow the terms of labor-management agreements and would
not have upset the TRO. The court may have properly applied the law, but the
legislature should address this situation by allowing employees to obtain
backpay if the TRO results from a violation of a collective bargaining
agreement.
2. The Limits on the Effectiveness of the Employer TRO to Reduce
Workplace Violence
There are three substantial limits to the effectiveness of an employer TRO
to address workplace violence. One criticism is that a restraining order often
will only enrage the offender to commit violence. This argument, also a criti-
cism of the existing TPO, reasons that TROs are unlikely to deter individuals
plotting criminal conduct.22 5 Because restraining orders are so confrontational,
they may increase the risk of violence. 2 6
A second criticism acknowledges that while TROs may be beneficial,
employers can generally still obtain equivalent relief by contacting police
officers to arrest individuals engaging in violence in the workplace. A lobbyist
for the Public Defender, concerned about the potential criminal liability for
offenders who violate an employer TRO, criticized the Nevada statute by argu-
ing that if an individual is trespassing, the employer can currently contact the
police to arrest the individual.2 27 One could argue that if there is a need for an
employer TRO it is only because employers are not effectively using existing
remedies.
The third, and most persuasive, argument about the limitations of the
employer TRO is that employer TROs will not affect the most serious offender
in workplace violence: the stranger (Type I). This offender is responsible for
eighty-four percent of workplace homicides2 28 and sixty percent of violent
225 Lingg, supra note 107, at 360.
226 Jeff Gottlieb, Agency Shooting Shows Access Can Have a Price, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 27,
1998, at Al (in this incident, the employer did not obtain a TRO because of the fear that
"[r]estraining orders almost always are risk elevators").
227 Minutes of the Senate Committee on Judiciary, 71st Sess. 15 (May 9, 2001), available at
http://www.leg.state.nv.us/71st/minutes/senate/jud/final/1332.html (last visited July 28,
2003) (statement of Mark S. Sertic).
228 DUHART, supra note 15, at 10 tbl.20.
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workplace incidents. 229 Because a TRO is-a targeted remedy, it requires that
the threat be identified in advance. The procedures for obtaining a TRO require
a specific defendant. A stranger may strike without warning and not return
again, or the employer may be unable to identify a recurring harasser when the
person is a stranger. These limitations suggest that the employer TRO will not
be an effective remedy to address workplace violence.
D. The Employer TRO: A Band-Aid Worth Applying
Because the three criticisms of the effectiveness of employer TROs have
some legitimacy, it is unfair to classify the employer TRO as a panacea to cure
workplace violence. There will be individuals who will not abide by the TRO.
An employer must determine if the TRO will help diffuse or escalate the vio-
lence, and determine if other options are more appropriate, based on the spe-
cific individual. While some violations of a TRO might ordinarily allow a
police officer to arrest an individual, the TRO clarifies certain activity which
may be non-violent as a crime, but which is based on prior violent activity and
a likelihood that the violence will continue.
Generally, TROs are considered more beneficial to the reduction of vio-
lence than they are harmful. As a result, the employer TRO operates as a band-
aid, and not a failure. The employer TRO, while not a practical remedy to
address stranger (Type I) violence, can conceivably be used against all other
forms, which account for at least forty percent of all violent incidents.2 3 ° In
addition, the employer is in a better position to prevent violence stemming from
individuals who are in the employer's control. The employer TRO will com-
plement existing options by giving employers the full realm of effective options
to address workplace violence and by supplying the employer with pre-inci-
dent, imminent incident, and post-incident responses. While existing laws must
be amended or harmonized to facilitate the employer TRO, this can be done by
the legislature as conflicts are identified. Potential conflicts with existing
employment laws should not hinder the development of new laws to address
problems in the workplace.
V. CONCLUSION
An effective approach to prevent workplace violence requires an inte-
grated scheme to address different types of workplace violence. One method
alone cannot adequately address each instance of workplace violence. Conse-
quently there may not be any panaceas to cure this ill. Unfortunately, even an
employer utilizing all of its legal options may be unable to avoid a particular
incident of workplace violence. The TRO can complement the existing pre-
ventative, corrective, and remedial options to more effectively control violence
in the workplace. The TRO, a band-aid of sorts, offers an important option for
employers to act deliberately and quickly to incidents that may be imminent.
The new phenomenon of the employer TRO will also present novel legal
issues to the employment relationship, but this is nothing new to the evolving
229 WARCHOL, supra note 19, at 4 tbl.8.
230 Id.
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areas of labor and employment law. Given the recent spread of employer
TROs, more states may be willing to consider the TRO and can build off of the
experiments in California, Arizona, and Nevada.
